ABSTRACT. This Note demonstrates that the American rules for impeaching witnesses developed against a cultural background that equated a woman's "honor," and thus her credibility, with her sexual virtue. The idea that a woman's chastity informs her credibility did not originate in rape trials and the confusing interplay between questions of consent and sexual history. Rather, gendered notions of honor so permeated American legal culture that attorneys routinely attempted to impeach female witnesses by involdng their sexual histories in cases involving such diverse claims as title to land, assault, arson, and wrongful death. But while many courts initially accepted the notion that an unchaste woman might be a lying witness, most jurisdictions ultimately rejected unchastity impeachment as illogical or irrelevant. In the process, the gendered notion of honor may have influenced judicial preference for reputation evidence over evidence regarding specific acts as a form of impeachment. The unchaste/incredible equation remained viable in the law of rape as courts continued to insist that the victim's sexual history was relevant to credibility, consent, or both. Although legal reforms have narrowed the use of sexual history evidence in rape trials, the concept that a woman's sexual virtue signifies her credibility survives today in moral turpitude law and in the treatment of prostitution as a crime that bears on credibility.
INTRODUCTION
Our legal system hinges on evaluations of credibility. Whom do we expect to tell the truth? When will they tell it? And how do we know they are telling it? These questions must arise, consciously or not, in the mind of any judge or juror who is asked to evaluate witness testimony. The need to judge credibility has been discussed by legal scholars and practitioners and addressed in evidentiary rules dealing with the use of character evidence at trial to impeach witnesses.' Missing from this dialogue, however, has been an understanding that the answers to these basic questions about truthfulness have differed on gender lines. ' This Note shows that as American courts developed rules for determining what could and could not be asked in order to impeach the credibility of witnesses, they did so against a cultural background that connected women's truthfulness to their chastity. A woman's "honor," or her culturally recognized moral integrity, 3 so depended on her sexual virtue that her credibility suffered limitations, the use of evidence of opinion or reputation to attack or support the credibility of a witness); FED R. EVID. 6o9 (allowing the credibility of a witness to be impeached with evidence of conviction of a crime, subject to limitations); ROBERTO ARON, KEVIN THOMAS from any real or perceived failings of that virtue. Part I argues that for men, while honor, credibility, and a reputation for truthfulness were fairly interchangeable in the popular imagination of the eighteenth century, the story for women was quite different. For women, honor and credibility depended on chastity and on the reputation for sexual virtue. Because female honor emphasized women's reputation for sexual purity and not their reputation for truth telling, truth itself was prescribed differently for women and men. Women were supposed to appear chaste, so they experienced social pressure to dissemble rather than present the appearance of impropriety. Men, to the contrary, were praised most when they were true to their word.
Part II shows how this gender difference resonated in early evidence cases as courts struggled to regulate the impeachment of female witnesses. While many courts questioned the rationality of using evidence of unchastity to prove untruthfulness, particularly just for one sex, others seemed to accept as a given the probative value of such chastity evidence. Even beyond the question of relevance, the unique importance of reputation for women's honor resonated in decisions on the type of proof to be allowed in character impeachmentwhether to allow evidence of reputation or specific acts. Early courts' inability to reach a consensus on the relevance of a woman's sexual virtue to her credibility -and, if so, how unchastity evidence should be adduced -illustrates the resilience of the gendered notion of honor. At the same time, that most jurisdictions ultimately prohibited lawyers from impeaching female witnesses with sexual history evidence marks a triumph of legal principle over a pervasive cultural norm. Unfortunately, this rationalist triumph did not extend to rape law.
That women who pressed rape charges were typically forced to respond to sexual history evidence will not surprise readers familiar with the history of rape law. Modern rape scholarship has effectively documented the gender biases that permeated the law of rape, biases that included routine permission to explore the victim's sexual history and thus to undermine her credibility. 4 This Note contributes the simple but important point that the link between female honor and chastity did not arise from the law of rape, but rather predated and informed rape law's development. Far from originating in rape trials and the confusing interplay between questions of consent, credibility, and sexual history, the idea that a woman's chastity informs her credibility so permeated American culture that attorneys in cases involving claims as diverse as title to land, assault, arson, and wrongful death routinely attempted to impeach female witnesses by invoking their sexual histories.' While early courts sometimes claimed to admit or exclude this chastity-related evidence depending on its purported relevance to the subject matter of the case at hand, they did not do so consistently. 6 Three points emerge from Part II's review of early law in this area. First, America's vision of the truthful woman incorporated ideas about her sexual purity and these ideas informed perceptions of the female witness. Second, the idea that an unchaste woman was also a lying woman arose in early impeachment jurisprudence even in cases where the female witnesses were not the victims of sexual crimes. Third, early courts more often than not thought independently and carefully enough to reject a sexual double standard for testing credibility, at least in cases not involving rape.
Part III shows that what seemed like a progressive retreat from the unchaste/incredible equation halted when the issue was rape. In rape cases, unchaste and incredible became unchaste and consenting, a development that might be viewed as a form of "preservation through transformation." 7 If legal logic had enabled many courts to reject the idea that chastity had a bearing on female credibility, the idea resurfaced when the question was posed as one of consent. Although the impossibility of drawing a bright line between evidence admitted to prove consent as opposed to credibility of the victim in a rape case (reporting an attempted impeachment of credibility of plaintiff widow in a wrongful death suit with evidence of a character for chastity); see also infra Part II.
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Compare Logan v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W. 676, 679 (Ky. 1917) (holding that a female witness in a murder case could be impeached with evidence of her bad reputation for virtue), with Shartzer v. State, 63 Md. 149, 152 (1885) (holding that "the prosecutrix could not be asked the question whether she had previously had connection with another person").
7.
See Siegel, supra note 2 (arguing that by recasting a husband's prerogative to beat his wife into a right to marital privacy, the law continued to protect wife-beating even after laws no longer expressly allowed such conduct).
seems obvious and has been well-documented, courts often insisted that sexual history was admissible to prove consent in a rape trial, although not credibility. Both before the passage of the rape shield laws in the 1970s and more recently in criticizing those laws, legal scholars and others have pointed out an inherent illogic and sexism in the law's approach to rape. 9 The very definition of the crime as the "carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will" meant that courts often required proof of sufficient "resistance" on the part of the woman." Further, corroboration requirements and mandatory jury instructions advising that the rape complainant's "testimony be scrutinized with caution" spoke to the enduring stereotype that "[r]ape [was] ... an accusation easily to be made, and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent."' 2 Scholars have generally understood this bias to come from the "longstanding suspicion of rape victims" 3 that developed under the "purview of ancient masculine codes" nicely: "Evidence that establishes consent by the complainant will simultaneously impeach her credibility, and evidence that impeaches her credibility will raise the likelihood of consent." Id. at 775-76.
9. See Estrich, supra note 2, at lO91 ("Sexism in the law of rape is no matter of mere historical interest; it endures, even where some of the most blatant testaments to that sexism have disappeared."); see also Berger, supra note 2; Ordover, supra note 2. io. Galvin 155 (1996) ("The law has historically considered women alleging rape to be particularly in-credible, and policymakers and judges developed special evidentiary rules, such as corroboration requirements, cautionary instructions, and the prompt complaint doctrine, to guard against the possibility that an innocent man would be convicted on the word of a vindictive, lying woman." (footnote omitted)).
centered around controlling women, often through the use of violence.'" That discourse has been powerful within its sphere, but it has not fully accounted for the proposition that, for women, "promiscuity imports dishonesty.
Section III.A explores the extent to which early rape jurisprudence was formed by the culturally entrenched equation of unchaste and incredible. While our cultural definition of sexual virtue has shifted drastically since the eighteenth century and even since the initial enactment of the rape shield statutes, the idea that a woman's sexual virtue bears upon her credibility is still present today. As Section III.B shows, modern courts admit evidence of prostitution as a crime bearing on credibility. 7 Although prostitution is no longer defined in gendered terms, women are still far more likely to be prosecuted for prostitution-related offenses. That evidence of prostitution can still be admitted to impeach the female witness shows the continuing vitality of the chastity/credibility equation. Even now, at the beginning of the twentyfirst century, courts decide whether or not to believe women based on perceptions of their sexual purity.
The cases this Note examines are illustrative, and the conclusions it draws from them are impressionistic. In the period covered, American courts in various states were developing a jurisprudence on these evidentiary questions that was confused and often confusing.1" Close and often almost metaphysical distinctions were and continue to be drawn. The distinction between evidence of reputation and evidence of specific bad or immoral acts is one example. This Note does not propose to survey the law in various jurisdictions on the questions of gender, sexual purity, and credibility. Instead, it shows that a connection between the three existed, that it was treated differently by different courts, and that it continues to be a salient connection today, even though it may be differently articulated. Honor, in sum, has been and still is gendered.
I. CHASTITY AS THE THRONE OF WOMEN'S HONOR
Honor is a cultural construct that connotes moral character, integrity, and trustworthiness.' 9 As such, it often served at least historically as a proxy for truthfulness in credibility determinations. 2 " The more honorable a person was perceived to be, the more believable he or she was. 2 Importantly, as American evidence jurisprudence began to develop in the nineteenth century and courts grappled with the need to make rules surrounding credibility determinations, the understanding of honor differed along gender lines. A woman's sexual virtue was entwined with her truthfulness to such an extent that the two were often perceived as conceptually identical." Justice Sutherland's majority opinion in the landmark Lochner-era case Adkins v. Children's Hospital testifies eloquently, if indirectly, to this reality. 3 In an opinion arguing against special wage rules for women, he proclaimed: " [F] or, certainly, if women require a minimum wage to preserve their morals men require it to preserve their honesty." ' The Court apparently considered neither rationale good enough to overcome the right to contractual freedom, but its characterization of what was at stake shows how utterly women's sexual purity could and did take the place of truthfulness. SOUTHERN Rich describes women's honor as having to do with "virginity, chastity, [and] fidelity to a husband. ,,2 The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) provides a similar definition for the honor "of a woman": "[c]hastity, purity, as a virtue of the highest consideration; reputation for this virtue, good name."" The dictionary provides no parallel definition for specifically "male" honor, leaving the impression that all other definitions, by default, refer to men and not women. The OED's examples of the uses of these definitions show how the definitions equate honor with truth and justice, and even specifically with men. 
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Id. Honesty is not specifically mentioned in the definition of honor. Yet the definition of honesty refers to honor. Thus the first definition given for "honest" is "the quality of being honest," which is further explained in terms of honor. In the third example, the OED refers to "honour gained by action or conduct; reputation, credit, good name." Id. at 349; see also 33 Thus, the oath, truth telling, and a sense of justice all combine to form a male morality that emerges in stark contrast to the prescriptions of chastity and purity that define female honor.
Early references to honor in American jurisprudence show that "[h]onor was indisputably a gendered system." 34 A selection of pre-190o cases reveals that when referring to transactions among men, advocates and judges commonly and unselfconsciously employed the term honor to convey the idea that a man will be true to his word.
3 " Justice Greene, writing for the Iowa Supreme Court in 1848, attempted to chart the relation between honor and honesty for men. According to the Justice, honesty was a necessary, though not a sufficient element of honor. Thus, though "to be honorable, a man must be strictly honest; still, he may be honest without being honorable. ' 146 (N.Y. Ch. 1845) ("There was no promise or condition, but he trusted to Mr. Wheelwright's honor."). In a sampling of cases taken from a set of almost 3500 pre-19oo cases returned in a Westlaw search for "honor" (excluding certain phrases, such as "your honor"), the vast majority refer to a man's honor as indicative of his faithfulness to an oath. honor" of a defaulting brother by paying or taking on his debts. 3 7 The resulting loss of credit in the community was so severe that it was to be avoided at all costs.
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References to women's honor in pre-19oo cases do not invoke the transactional oath or bond. 9 As the OED definition predicts, the word "honor" as applied to women, when it did come up in the courtroom, meant chastity or fidelity to a husband. The argument in a mid-nineteenth century New Hampshire breach of promise suit highlights the conceptual divide between male honor, or bond keeping, and female honor, or chastity. 4° The male plaintiff had accused a woman of breaching her promise to marry him and offered evidence to show she had instead married another man. In seeking to exclude that evidence, the defense lawyer argued that it would only be relevant if it "went directly to prove acts inconsistent with the honor" of his client. 4' By invoking his client's honor, however, the attorney did not mean to refer to whether or not she broke her word. Instead, he used the word to refer to her chastity, arguing that the prosecution's evidence was irrelevant since it could, at most, prove acts of unchastity, not her marriage to the other man. Thus, even when a woman's pledge was the issue in the case, when defense counsel spoke of her "honor," he did so to connote chastity, rather than truthfulness. 4 2 Not only were women supposed to be chaste, loyal, and pure; they were also supposed to maintain a reputation for being so. The late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century discourse on women's honor illuminates the tension between valuing reputation and valuing truth telling in its own right. 43 JeanJacques Rousseau elaborates one of the most repercussive views of the "moral difference between the sexes" in Lmile, his influential treatise on education. 44 Available in translation in late colonial America and in the early years of the Republic, Rousseau's "work on women had very definite and far-reaching American influence." 4s According to Rousseau, the key to female virtue lies equally in the thing itself and in its appearance. He justifies his claim that women must maintain both their chastity and their reputations by referring to the difficulty of establishing paternity. If a woman does not preserve her reputation, a husband may doubt his wife's fidelity. 46 This doubt can in turn (1998) , meant that demonstrations of loyalty to a husband would not be construed as other than the natural product of wifely devotion, see HARTOG, supra, at 186. Ironically, even as the court asserted that a married woman could be treated as a "free and independent property holder," it used the idea of women's oath of loyalty to her husband to support its conclusion. Id.
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Professor Gross argues that Southern male honor, in contrast to its Northern counterpart, contained a similar emphasis on appearance. GRoss, supra note 19, at 48 ("Whereas New Englanders recognized a strong division between external appearances and one's inner, 'true' self, so that reputation could serve only as evidence of character, to nineteenth-century Southerners, appearances were what mattered." (emphasis omitted)). lead to the husband's inability to love his children because he is "haunted by the suspicion that this is the child of another." 4 7 Thus, a husband's doubt of his wife's fidelity is as damaging as her actual infidelity would be. By such reasoning, Rousseau completes the path from a woman's failure to appear virtuous to the disintegration of her family. 48 Using the word honor, Rousseau defines what he sees as the moral imperative for women. He writes:
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU,
Worth alone will not suffice, a woman must be thought worthy; nor beauty, she must be admired; nor virtue, she must be respected. A woman's honour does not depend on her conduct alone, but on her reputation, and no woman who permits herself to be considered vile is really virtuous. 4 9
Unlike male honor, for Rousseau, women's honor depends on "what people [will] think."" 0 Thus, a woman must both be pure and appear to be pure in supra note 38, at 34. Following in this great tradition, male Enlightenment thinkers "insisted that chastity was woman's highest virtue and left the double standard of sexual behavior intact." 2 ANDERSON & ZINSSER, supra note 38, at 118. 47 . ROUSSEAU, supra note 44, at 325.
48. Rousseau's emphasis on appearances for women is born out in the literature of his day and throughout the nineteenth century. The great heroines of nineteenth century novels constantly worry about the need to protect their reputations. In Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice, Lizzy and Jane Bennet resign themselves to the possibility that they will never marry after their sister, Lydia, sullies the family name by running away with her lover. JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE 197-99 (Donald Gray ed., W.W. Norton 1993) (1813) . Frances Burney's Evelina, although an extremely innocent young woman, constantly threatens her own honor by placing herself in apparently compromising social situations, the most memorable of which is, perhaps, her stroll through the public gardens in the company of two prostitutes. FRANCES BURNEY, EVELINA 274-75 (Kristina Straub ed., Bedford
Books 1997) (1778). The cultural ubiquity of instructional guides for women further emphasizes the importance of a woman's reputation to her social acceptability. Conduct books sought to help women achieve a kind of visible purity necessary for establishing reputation, which was in turn the key to a successful marriage. order to be virtuous. Rousseau goes on to describe a concern for reputation as the "grave of a man's virtue and the throne of a woman's."" 1 By creating such a startling division between male and female definitions of honor, Rousseau problematizes truth for women. Whereas men may "defy public opinion" as long as they do right, doing right is only "half' the task for women. 2 With this pivotal assertion, Rousseau implicitly denies women the freedom to act on conscience. By admitting that doing right could involve defying public opinion, he indicates that society's prescriptions may not always encourage truth. And if we acknowledge that actual truth and virtue are often misperceived by society, women's need to maintain their reputations may create the paradoxical situation in which they are socially required to deceive. Thus, women's honor not only differs from men's in its emphasis on purity or loyalty to one's spouses, but it also equates credibility with the appearance of chastity while ignoring actual truthfulness as an independent value.
In In a suit for divorce, the court chastised a male witness who testified that he had had an affair with the plaintiffs wife: "When a man voluntarily appears in court, and swears away the reputation of a woman, who, as he claims, has sacrificed her honor for him, his testimony should be viewed with suspicion." Fawcett v. Fawcett, 61 N.Y.S. lo8, lo9 (Sup. Ct. 1899). In this case, the word honor functions in a gendered way as a synonym for fidelity to a husband. Rather than take the side of the husband, however, Fawcett emphasized the sacred status of a woman's reputation for virtue. This move can also be interpreted as the court's striving to protect the institution of marriage and to reserve divorce for cases in which more than one witness could testify to infidelity or other serious breaches of the marital vow.
52. RoUssEAu, supra note 44, at 328. Rousseau's conception of male honor, that it has to do only with internal truthfulness, presents one side of an age-old conflict in conceptions of male honor. Scholars have argued that the Rousseauian vision of male honor was more prevalent in the early northern United States, while for white southern men, "[u]pholding honor required public display." GRoss, supra note 19, at 47; see also, WYATT-BROWN, supra note 19. Thus, male honor sometimes suffered from the need for its exterior display. Still, it centered on oaths and truth telling, whether public or private, while women faced the problem of needing to appear virtuous and chaste in order to maintain their honor. Rousseau called women's "throne" -her reputation -to deceit. Wollstonecraft argues that women necessarily lose sight of the divine spirit of truth because "it is the eye of man that they have been taught to dread."" 5 This dread of man's condemnation or the loss of man's respect is also reinforced by society and its products. Wollstonecraft explains, "Advice respecting behaviour, and all the various modes of preserving a good reputation, which have been so strenuously inculcated on the female world, [are] specious poisons, that incrusting morality eat away the substance." 6 She eschews the "puerile attention to mere ceremonies," which she sees as corrupting women's sense of true values.1 7 In a perfect society, the good woman and the reputedly good woman would be the same. In the kind of imperfect society that Rousseau himself exposes in Emile, however, social prescription and truth are not always aligned. Thus, Wollstonecraft highlights a logic that meant both that chastity and truth telling were one and the same for women and that even chaste women might have to lie in order to keep up appearances and maintain their credibility. In addition to its likely contribution to the enduring stereotype of the female liar, s8 this entwinement of chastity and honor meant that for a woman, if either her chastity or reputation for chastity were lost, her honor and reputation for truthfulness went with them. Women's honor, then, encompassed a fraught set of values that privileged chastity and the reputation for sexual virtue over truthfulness. As a result, when a woman was "unchaste" or appeared so, she not only lost her honor in the eyes of her community, but also her credibility.
II. THE LEGAL HISTORY OF GENDERED HONOR: EVIDENCE LAW
If this eighteenth-and nineteenth-century cultural discourse suggests gendered answers to the basic questions about truth telling -"Whom do we expect to tell the truth? When will they tell it? And how do we know they are telling it?" -then we would expect to see women's credibility being attacked in court through questions about their chastity or reputation for sexual purity. Whether this was indeed the case is a question that can be answered by looking at early case law on the ground rules for impeaching witnesses. 59 The form that impeachment could take, however, remained far from settled as the United States developed its evidence jurisprudence. As one New York judge pointed out in evident frustration in 1837, "It is a little remarkable, considering the great number of times the subject must have come under discussion, that it is not incontestably settled, what is the precise form of inquiry to be resorted to for the purpose of impeaching the general credibility of a witness.,, 6 ' However, one method of inquiry resorted to with frequency and contention was the use of evidence of unchastity to attack women's credibility.6i
This Part paints a portrait of the early law on the permissibility of impeaching witnesses with evidence of unchastity. 6 2 Section II.A takes up two early cases that shaped American jurisprudence on this issue. One, from Massachusetts, 6 permitted unchastity evidence to impeach the credibility of a female witness. The other, from New York, 6 4 reached the opposite conclusion but did so on a technical ground that avoided the core question. Even as these courts were divided on how to respond to impeachment with "sexual morality, ''6 , their opinions reflect a culture unable to conceptualize the credibility of women without reference to their chastity to the extent that when 59. It is important to note that although the rules for impeaching witnesses differ materially from those on impeaching parties, particularly defendants, early courts did not always differentiate between these various types of impeachment. 62. The account given in this Part is not strictly linear because, like the common law they sought to apply, these cases' import is better understood by analogy than by date. Just as courts in these early cases almost invariably looked to out-of-state precedent for guidance, I have paired cases from various states that best articulate major themes. Because cultural constructs of honor have maintained their vitality even after they had seemingly been abandoned, the Note also pairs cases separated by many years. Nevertheless, this Part shows the law for what it was: a cubist portrait, but a portrait nonetheless of a country confronting difficult questions of proof and entrenched gender stereotypes. rejecting such impeachment attempts, judges often implicitly acknowledged that an unchaste woman reasonably might be thought of as untrustworthy. Section II.B explores the technical question that was at the center of the New York case: whether a witness's character can be impeached with evidence of specific acts as opposed to reputation evidence. This question, long familiar to legal scholars, has special ramifications in cases involving women and chastity. Section II.C uses Missouri's experience as a case study to demonstrate courts' movement away from allowing women to be impeached with evidence of their unchastity. The Missouri cases tell a story whose narrative line is otherwise hard to trace in the patchwork of cases nationwide. Missouri courts initially admitted evidence of women's unchastity as bearing on their credibility but, after almost a century of conflicting case law on the topic, ultimately disallowed such impeachment. Section II.D outlines the general movement away from permitting evidence of chastity as a signal of credibility. Evidentiary principles instructed judges to inquire into the logical connection between a woman's chastity and her credibility, an inquiry that generally led to the evidence being excluded as irrelevant or improperly adduced. Ultimately, this history underscores the extent to which jurists felt constrained by legal principles to reject a fallacious probative link between a woman's chastity and her credibility.
The developments traced in this Part reveal three important insights. First, this country's vision of the truthful woman was fraught with ideas about her sexual purity, and this vision informed how women's credibility was judged at trial. Second, the equation between unchastity and untruthfulness entered early impeachment jurisprudence involving women even in cases where the female witnesses were not the victims of sexual crimes. 66 Third, although proceeding in fits and starts, states ultimately barred the use of unchastity evidence to impeach credibility in cases other than rape trials, a surprising outcome for an evidentiary system that has been criticized as benefiting men at the expense of women. 6 7 66. While this evidentiary question also arose in the context of sexual assault prosecutions, the women being impeached with unchastity evidence were often merely witnesses at the trials of others. This Part focuses almost exclusively on the latter situation. 
A. Setting the Stage: Murphy's Legacy
In 1817, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided in Commonwealth v. Murphy that proof of unchastity could be used to impeach a female defense witness in a rape case. 68 Although the recorded account of the case contains barely over one hundred words and Massachusetts first limited its holding and then explicitly overruled it in 1846,69 the case continued to have currency in other jurisdictions for nearly a century. 7 For example, thirty-four years after Massachusetts disavowed Murphy, Missouri used it to strengthen its own version of the rule that a woman could be impeached with unchastity evidence. 7 New York, by contrast, firmly rejected Murphy in 1837 as an anomalous and incorrect statement of the common law. 72 Deployed on both sides of the debate, Murphy is an obvious starting point and a helpful guide to judicial attitudes toward impeaching female witnesses with chastity evidence.
Although Murphy was a rape case, the woman the state's attorney sought to discredit was a defense witness who was allegedly known as a prostitute and had borne several children out of wedlock. 73 The defendant's lawyer objected to the use of this evidence to impeach her, but unsuccessfully. The judge ruled that "[t]he credibility of a witness may... be properly impeached, by proving her to be of such a character. ' 7 4 The judge directly linked the witness's chastity to her truthfulness, observing that "a common prostitute must necessarily have greatly corrupted, if not totally lost, the moral principle, and of course her respect for truth and her regard to the sacredness of an oath. ' 7 ' This argument followed logically from the cultural belief that a woman who is unchaste has 68. 14 Mass. at 387, 13 Tyng at 387-88. lost her honor. A woman without honor, in turn, could not be trusted to tell the truth, even when sworn under oath.
Because Murphy involved an alleged "common prostitute," the court's unwillingness to trust such a witness could be attributable to the perceived immorality (or illegality) of prostitution itself. The crimes of men, however, were treated differently. As the New York court noted twenty years later in Bakeman v. Rose, "[I]t is perfectly well settled, both in [New York] and in England" that evidence that a person had a reputation for committing crimes, such as being a "murderer, forger, adulterer, gambler, [or] swindler," could not be admitted to impeach a witness.7
6 Such a rule points away from perceived immorality or illegality alone to explain why prostitution would signal untruthfulness. Indeed, courts that rejected the use of prostitution evidence for impeachment pointed out that a reputation for immoral conduct or criminal behavior was not generally admissible to discredit a witness.
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Bakeman v. Rose serves as an instructive counterpoint to Murphy. In Bakeman, a female witness was called to testify for the prosecution in an assault and battery case. The defendant sought to impeach her with testimony that she was a common prostitute. Bakeman firmly rejected such impeachment, but it did so by resting on the form of the evidence. 
78.
In Bakenan, as in many of the early cases discussed herein, the opinions were not designated as "majority," "concurrence," or "dissent," but instead bore the name or title of the judges who wrote them. This Note infers the more modern labels for ease of reading. crime, or species of crimes, or immoralities .... , By focusing on whether the evidence used in impeaching the witness spoke to her general character or to some specific act, the majority left ambiguous how much of its holding was due to the absence of a connection between truth and chastity, and how much to the technical form of impeaching evidence. The concurrence, however, did not hesitate to suggest that a woman's honor is bound up in her chastity:
[I]f the mode of impeaching her credibility had been to inquire of the witnesses, first as to their knowledge of her general moral character, and then whether from such knowledge they would believe her upon her oath, I imagine it would have been difficult to find a witness, having any regard to his own character, and knowing her general reputation to be that of a public prostitute, who would have ventured to maintain for her the credibility of an ordinary witness.
This nod to the conventional wisdom of the day is particularly noteworthy in an opinion that praises the rationality of the common law by distinguishing it from the "Mahomedan or... Hindoo codes, or ... the fastidious refinements of the Roman law.' ' 81 Yet, even as it lauded the common law for "reject[ing] the conclusion that a person guilty of one immoral habit, is necessarily disposed to practice all others, ' 2 the concurrence still implicitly connected mendacity with unchastity. By its logic, such evidence could reasonably be admitted so long as it was filtered through the mind of the impeaching witness who would silently use the knowledge that a woman was a prostitute to decide that she was not credible.
By assuming that want of chastity signals a woman's willingness to lie in court, the judges in Murphy, and even Bakeman, reflect the gendered understanding of honor that Rousseau articulated. This mode of judicial reasoning bespeaks a culture that, even as it demanded purity from women, 79. Bakeman, 18 Wend. at 146, 148. An earlier New York case presages this reasoning. In Jackson v. Lewis, 13 Johns. 504 (N.Y. 1816), a case involving a real estate transaction, the court refused to allow the proposed impeachment of a female witness with evidence that she had been a prostitute in part because "the inquiry as to any particular immoral conduct is not admissible against a witness." Id. at 505-06 (emphasis added).
Bakeman, 18
Wend. at 153.
81.
Id. at 154. At argument, the appellant had invoked an Islamic rule prohibiting women from testifying unless the circumstance meant that no male witness could have been present. Id. at 149. Neither of the two opinions in the case welcomed this attempt to influence the result by invoking foreign law.
82. Id. privileged a reputation for chastity over actual truth telling, making that reputation for sexual virtue the pinnacle of female honor. Although Murphy proved to be an anomaly in Massachusetts, which ultimately adopted a rule similar to that of New York, 8 3 the idea that a woman's unchastity could be used to impeach her credibility on the witness stand would resonate across the nation for over a century.
B. Reputation Versus Specific Acts: Proving Immorality
As is evident from the Bakeman v. Rose majority opinion, courts' preoccupation with the mechanics of character impeachment further complicated the analysis of whether a woman's sexual history was relevant to her honesty. Whether specific act or reputation evidence should be used for character impeachment 84 is a debate that accounts for much of the ink expended in nineteenth-century opinions on impeachment. The majority of courts came to prefer reputation evidence. The stated rationale for this preference was that admitting evidence as to particular facts would weigh down the trial with time-consuming collateral detail. 8 181 (1837) (arguing that the reputation rule avoids freighting the trial "with such an accumulated burthen of collateral proof, that the administration of justice would become impracticable"). Essentially, courts relied on an efficiency explanation to justify their preference for reputation over specific act evidence. Wigmore refers to the exclusion of specific act evidence as an "Auxiliary Policy"
117: 1854 2oo8
Wigmore, on the other hand, believed that the rule limiting impeachment to reputation evidence was an American perversion of the earlier English rule that focused on the personal belief of the impeaching witness grounded in his or her "personal knowledge" of the person whose credibility was at issue. 8 9 Wigmore cites the phraseology of two prominent evidence treatises as possible reasons for the shift, but acknowledges that "the exact course of the change is obscure."" 0 This Note offers another explanation." The debate in American courts over the use of reputation versus specific acts evidence in the context of efforts to impeach female witnesses with unchastity evidence suggests why many courts ultimately settled on reputation as the more desirable mode of proof. For the same reason that the use of reputation evidence was singularly damaging to female witnesses who were expected, under the rubric of female honor, to maintain spotless reputations, judges may have been more receptive to the idea that evidence of reputation would be a relevant and informative method of impeachment. Thus, the development of procedural rules in the area of character impeachment may also be a story informed by the nation's complex view of women and their credibility.
In seeking to use sexual history to attack a female witness's credibility, attorneys necessarily engaged the difficult procedural questions surrounding "bad character" impeachments. 92 And, like the judges in Bakeman, many jurists responded by focusing on the reputation/specific acts question rather than on the probative value of sexual history, however proved. 3 The majority concern rather than a problem with relevance. 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 979, at 360. 
4 WIGMORE
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In an early defamation case, for example, the Kentucky court seemed to want to set the record straight on its impeachment rules when it decided to notice an unappealed error committed by the plaintiffs lawyer when impeaching a female witness. Evans v. Smith, 21 Ky. 364, 5 T.B. Mon. 237 (1827). At trial, the plaintiffs counsel had asked whether a defense witness had the reputation of an "unchaste woman" who had "lived with a certain man as his wife four or five years, without having been married to him." Id. at 366. The court's concern was not, as a modern reader might assume, that the plaintiffs lawyer had brought up irrelevant evidence about the woman's personal life. Instead, the judge focused on the method of impeachment, noting that it had been attempted with reference to "particular instances of moral turpitude." Id. The case report provides the following summary: "It may preference for reputation evidence 94 had particular ramifications for female witnesses, whose honor depended as much on their reputations as their actual moral integrity. 9 At the same time, those courts may have made what scholars have labeled a "misguided choice" ' 6 in favor of reputation evidence to prove character precisely because the question arose so often in the context of female witnesses and their chastity. Since reputation seemed probative in the context of female witnesses, courts dealing with character impeachments of women would have been more inclined to adopt that mode of proof. In other words, reputation's centrality to female honor may explain both why it was especially problematic for women to be impeached using what Wigmore referred to as "the secondhand, irresponsible product of multiplied guesses and gossip that we call 'reputation' ' 97 and why courts adopted reputation as the proper method for impeaching character. The majority opinion in Bakeman underscores the most basic concern with proof by reputation:
[I]t would be much safer for a female witness to permit the adverse party to prove the fact that she was a common prostitute, than to attempt to impeach her credit by showing it by general reputation; as there would be some chance of refuting the charge, if it was false, in the one case, when there would not be any in the other. be proved against the credit of a witness, that she has the reputation of an unchaste woman, but not that she does in fact live in a state of concubinage." Id. Thus, not only did it take for granted the connection between chastity and credibility, the court ignored any special implications a rule focusing on reputation would have in that context.
94.
See, e.g., BEST, supra note 1, 248, at 290 ("The credibility of a witness is always in issue, and accordingly general evidence is receivable to show that the character and reputation which he bears are such that he is unworthy to be believed, even when upon his oath. But evidence of particular facts, or particular transactions, cannot be received for this purpose .... "); STARKtE By arguing that a woman would prefer to refute an actual accusation of prostitution than to contest her "reputation" for the same, the Bakeman court offers a powerful condemnation of the latter form of proof.
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The majority's argument against reputation evidence-that it is better to be accused of something specific, which a witness might then have a chance of disproving-could apply to all kinds of impeaching testimony, not just that involving unchastity. Yet courts' preference for reputation evidence is both more disturbing and more easily explained in cases where the question was a woman's reputation for sexual virtue. As Rousseau taught, a woman's reputation for virtue was to be protected as a separate commodity.'°0 As such, it became its own measure of truth in a society that thought of a woman's credibility as measured by her sexual virtue.
Craft v. State, an 1866 Kansas decision, attests to the cultural notion that notorious unchastity would be worse than private transgressions, particularly for women.
0 ' At trial, the defendant, who was accused of murder, sought to exclude or limit the testimony of a female witness on the grounds that she was a prostitute. The Chief Justice rejected the idea that a prostitute's testimony should be excluded as a matter of law unless it was corroborated.'
2 He sought to make his point by analogy to a result he seemed to believe his audience would find absurd: even outwardly virtuous women would be implicated under a logic that equated any loss of virtue with untruthfulness. He argued:
A woman's chastity should be the "immediate jewel of her soul," and, with reference to consequences to herself, the very last virtue she would be willing to surrender; but when it is considered that she is regarded as the weaker vessel ... it ought not to be said when, in the warmth of sexual excitement ... she submits to the embraces of her lascivious lover, that she pours from her heart at Venus' shrine with her virtue every other good quality with which, in our thoughts, we endow her sex. Yet the position assumed must come to that. If, as a matter of law, her testimony must be rejected when her virtue is lost, the principle will be the same whether she habitually flaunts her frailty in the face of the 99. The judge may have been freer to make this observation because he viewed any evidence of unchastity as inadmissible and held that the only inquiry was as to evidence of a general character for truth and veracity. See supra Section II.A. world, or attempts to hide it in retiracy, or garnish it with garlands of good works." 0 3
While acknowledging the cultural importance of female chastity, the court clearly felt that a bright line rule connecting chastity with credibility, if taken to its logical conclusion, would be socially overinclusive by implicating women who were outwardly chaste. Almost a half century later in a bleak and contentious statutory rape case from North Dakota, State v. Apley, the majority opinion still reflected a belief that a woman's reputation for unchastity was more informative than unchaste acts themselves. In Apley, however, the court ruled that a woman's reputation for unchastity was relevant to credibility. A fifteen-year-old girl had accused her father of raping her when she was twelve. The court held that she could be asked on cross-examination if she had lived in a brothel because "[i]t bore upon her general credibility. 1°4 Although the girl was under the age of consent, the judge ruled that, indeed, evidence that she had "immoral habits" would affect her credibility.' 5 In making his point, the judge adduced a "distinction ... between permitting such cross-examination and the crossexamination upon specific acts of unchastity. ,, 6 According to the judge, living in a "house of prostitution"' 0 7 and other such "escapades" When focused on women and evidence of perceived sexual promiscuity, the specific act versus general reputation debate recapitulates Rousseau's description of reputation as the throne of female honor. The ascendancy of reputation over truthfulness or even chastity in the calculus of women's honor meant that a rule excluding facts while allowing reputation evidence about chastity would be uniquely damaging to a female witness. Because a woman's reputation was of paramount importance, the fact that she had the reputation for committing adultery would condemn her without more. It would not matter if that reputation were deserved or not. Its existence would mean that the woman was dishonored and therefore untrustworthy. Further, a woman impeached by such reputation evidence would be perceived as having committed the dual sin of protecting neither her reputation nor her chastity.
C. Missouri: A Case Study
Beginning in 185o, the Missouri courts produced a series of opinions that provide a helpful lens for understanding the nineteenth-century case law on this issue. The Missouri cases are particularly instructive because they arose in relatively quick succession, generated extensive debate among various jurists in the state, and grappled explicitly with the question of gender-specific rules for impeachment with unchastity. 1 "' They illustrate how difficult it was for courts to reject the idea that a woman's chastity might bear on her credibility. At the same time, when Missouri eventually rejected the rule, it brought itself in line with a majority of its fellow states, most of which had experienced a corresponding evolution.
In the first case in this sequence, State v. Shields, the issue was whether a lower court in an assault and battery trial had improperly excluded a question about a female witness's "general character for chastity. 12 The court decided and thereby her honor and credibility with a single indiscreet act, Judge Goss implies that a woman's reputation would still be tarnished by claims of prostitution but possibly not by single acts of unchastity. This apparent cultural shift seems to have been arrested at the boundary of prostitution. ' Possibly influenced by the nature of the case-a white police officer had been shot and the main witness for the black male defendant was a black woman -the court reached back to the long-overruled Murphy decision in Massachusetts to hold that a female witness's general reputation for having "descended into ... miscegenous prostitution" would be relevant for impeachment purposes.6
Until the early 189os, however, Missouri's appellate courts had not determined whether a man could be impeached with chastity evidence. The two most likely explanations for this derive from an understanding of the way in which honor was gendered. Either men were simply not being impeached (or permitted to be impeached) with evidence regarding their chastity at the trial court level or such impeachment was not viewed as particularly harmful and therefore not appealed, or both. The second of three conflicting Missouri Supreme Court decisions on the impeachment question bears out the latter possibility." 7 The court in State v. Shroyer held that a male defendant accused of attempted rape could be impeached with general evidence concerning his "sobriety and chastity." ' 18 The majority opined that the usual objections to admitting chastity evidence for men were illogical: "If it be true that the general character of a man is not affected by his reputation for unchastity, the evidence of such reputation will do him no injury."" 9 It is not clear why, if it believed male unchastity to be irrelevant to truth, the court did not go on to conclude the evidence should have been excluded as irrelevant. If it did not wish to overturn the verdict, the court could have called this harmless error. The Supreme Court's oblique opinion in Shroyer left open the question whether, in fact, Missouri courts would hold the credibility of a man to be affected by his reputation for unchastity. Prior to Shroyer, the St. Louis Court of Appeals had twice answered that question in the negative."' Both of these appellate opinions seem to take for granted a distinction between male and female honor on the issue of chastity, refusing to allow chastity evidence to impeach male witnesses."' In one, the court bluntly stated that a man's reputation for unchastity, in contrast to that of a woman, was not relevant to his credibility for reasons that were "obvious and need[ed] no comment."'.
Finally, in 1895, in an opinion issued over strenuous dissent, the Missouri Supreme Court adopted a gender-specific rule. State v. Sibley involved a male defendant who appealed his conviction for rape on the ground, among others, that evidence of his sexual proclivities had been improperly admitted.' 3 The defendant, L.D. Sibley, had been convicted of "defiling, debauching, and carnally knowing" his stepdaughter Lula Hawkins beginning when she was between twelve and thirteen years old. Ms. Hawkins testified that she was repeatedly raped by her stepfather, that when she became pregnant he gave her medicine that made her hallucinate and vomit, but that the drugs did not succeed in aborting the fetus. Ms. Hawkins testified that she told her mother about the rapes, but that her mother took no steps to stop them until she sent Lula away when she became pregnant.' 4 On the stand, Lula's mother denied knowledge of any improper relations between her husband and her daughter.
Of the five questions on appeal, the most divisive was whether a man's reputation for chastity was admissible to impeach his credibility. character for chastity and virtue was bad.' ' 2s On appeal, the Sibley majority held that this testimony was irrelevant and harmful. After acknowledging a conflict in recent Missouri precedent, the majority reasoned, "It is a matter of common knowledge that the bad character of a man for chastity does not even in the remotest degree affect his character for truth, when based upon that alone, while it does that of a woman. ' '126 The court's explanation for such a stark divide in the markers of male and female honesty recalls the central role chastity played in determining a woman's reputation relative to that of a man:
It is no compliment to a woman to measure her character for truth by the same standard that you do that of a man's predicated upon character for chastity. What destroys the standing of the one in all the walks of life has no effect whatever on the standing for truth of the other. Thus ... it is said: "Adultery has been committed openly by distinguished and otherwise honorable members [of the bar] as well in Great Britain as in our own country, yet the offending party has not been supposed to destroy the force of the obligation which they feel from the oath of office." Dr. Johnson said, in discussing the difference of turpitude between lewdness in a man and in a woman, "that he would not receive back a daughter because her husband, in the mere wantonness of appetite, had gone into the servant girl." And so McCaulay said, respecting the weakness of Lord Byron for sexual pleasure, "that it was an infirmity he shared with many great and noble men,-Lord Somers, Charles James Fox, and others." '
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While bereft of any attempt to reason through the different treatment of male and female "wantonness," the majority opinion exposes the dual nature of honor and its relation to truthfulness. An "honorable" man could commit adultery without harming his reputation for truthfulness, but a woman's honor, and thereby her credibility, were damaged when she was accused of lewdness. The dissent points out the fallacy, if not the cultural falsity, of the theory advanced by the majority with its list of unchaste and prominent men. If a prostitute has "so impaired her moral sense that the obligation to speak the truth is no longer binding," the dissent asks, why is the same not true of her customers?12 8 Why would a man's "disregard of the laws of chastity" not equally tend to prove a "disposition to lightly regard the obligations of his oath?" ' 29 Although unable to rebut the principal strength of the majority position-its cultural accuracy-the dissent's logical reasoning ultimately did prove itself more powerful in courts across the country. In 1935, Missouri abandoned the rule admitting evidence of a witness's "bad reputation for morality" that had allowed women to be impeached with evidence of their unchastity.' 3° In State v. Williams, the Missouri Supreme Court ruled that it was error to impeach a woman accused of killing her husband with evidence "that her general reputation in the community for morality ... was bad." 1 3' The court recognized the prejudicial nature of such impeaching evidence, particularly for a defendant, "[fWor a bad reputation for morality imports moral turpitude."' 32 Instead, it held "the impeaching testimony should be confined to the real and ultimate object of the inquiry, which is the reputation of the witness for truth and veracity."
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Although coming to this conclusion later than many, Missouri's decision in Williams aligned it with a majority of jurisdictions banning the use of various forms of so-called morality evidence to impeach a witness. As evidenced much earlier in New York and then Massachusetts, 3 4 these courts determined that a reputation for truth and veracity was the sine qua non of honesty and formed the only relevant inquiry when impeaching a witness. By 1935, according to the court in Williams, "[i]n twenty-two states the impeachment evidence is confined to the reputation of the witness for truth and veracity.' 3 Further, in 128. Id. at 172 (Gantt, J., dissenting in part). those jurisdictions still allowing evidence of bad general character, many courts maintained that "the line be drawn at bad general character, and that no specific quality other than that of veracity be considered."" 6
D. Rationality's Triumph, or Merely a Transformation?
To the extent that courts eventually eliminated the general use of morality evidence to impeach a witness, the debate over chastity and credibility represents something of a success story for the Enlightenment rationality espoused by early jurists. ' 37 Although scholars have pointed out that concomitant problems arise from an evidence system that privileges "fact over value, reason over emotion ... and perception over intuition, '' ,,8 in this instance that very concern with the "science of proof,"' 3 9 as Wigmore calls it, seems to have allowed the judiciary to overcome a prejudice still present in the culture. In Williams, for example, Judge Ellison wrote that "reason" favored admitting only evidence of truth and veracity; to make that point, he went on to identify the rationales for such a rule. 4 138. Hunter, supra note 13, at 129. Professor Hunter argues that the evidence laws impart greater value to stereotypically "masculine" attributes such as reason to the detriment of those, such as sexual assault victims, who are, by virtue of their particular victimization, necessarily perceived as stereotypically "feminine." Id. at 13o; see also Nicolson, supra note 137 (arguing that mainstream evidence scholarship has a masculine bias). [t] hat it reaches directly the fundamental object of the inquiry; (2) that a general bad reputation for morality does not always necessarily import a lack of veracity; (3) that the conclusions of an ordinary impeaching witness on such a question are apt to be drawn inexactly from uncertain data, or to rest on personal prejudice or honest differences of opinion on points of belief or conduct; (4) that impeachment by methods so loose and inconclusive often.., introduces collateral issues; (5) and that while witnesses may be directly discredited by proof of former convictions, or admissions of fact involving moral turpitude, still they ought not to be subjected to impeachment by indefinite hearsay, i. e.
[sic] by proof of bad repute for morality.
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automatically exclude the evidence of a prostitute, the Chief Justice explained that "[t]he law is certainly not so unreasonable." 14 ' And as early as 1835, Chief Justice Gibson had used a similar argument to make Pennsylvania one of the first states to clearly ban evidence of prostitution to impeach the credibility of a female witness. 142 Refusing even to acknowledge the possibility that her chastity might bear directly on a woman's veracity, Chief Justice Gibson wrote: "If character for veracity be the legitimate point of inquiry, and if to this complexion it must come at last, it follows that it is the only one, and that an inquiry into anything else is illegitimate.'
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Whether influenced by the rule of law and its attendant demand for relevant, logically probative evidence, by better information, or by some degree of cultural change, courts in early twentieth century cases regularly excluded sexual history evidence as a method of impeachment. In 1913, a North Dakota opinion marshaled over eighty cases to support the proposition that evidence of "moral character," or specifically chastity evidence, "should not be admitted for the purpose alone of impeachment."'" Significantly, however, this opinion was written in dissent from State v. Apley, the statutory rape case. The dissenters wished to "protest against [the] adoption" of a rule allowing a woman to be impeached with chastity evidence. Thus, despite those eightyodd cases, the serpentine grip of chastity on a woman's credibility had yet to be fully disengaged. 141 And although the Apley dissent argues courageously against the majority's decision, it also points to the new frontier for women's honor: the use of chastity evidence to prove consent in sexual assault cases. For at the same time that Apley's dissent condemned the "admissibility of the testimony as to the girl's prior chastity to the sole purpose of affecting her credibility," it explicitly left open the question whether such evidence would be relevant to 
III. GENDERED HONOR: MODERN EVIDENCE
A. Proving Consent: Gendered Honor Retouched
Even as these early cases ultimately seemed to reject a gendered vision of honor, the portrait was actually being retouched. Logic had taught that although lawyers almost invariably sought to influence juries by impeaching a female witness's credibility with chastity evidence, this type of questioning could not reasonably be permitted in a court of law. Yet, the same courts that denied the link between unchastity and credibility when a female witness testified in a case not involving her own honor often abandoned that logic when the witness was a woman bringing a rape accusation. 147 In sexual assault trials, many judges meticulously noted that evidence of the victim's sexual history was entirely relevant on the question of consent even though it would not be relevant on the question of credibility. 1 4 They did not explain exactly how, particularly in light of the history of such impeachment, unchastity evidence could speak to consent without at the same time shaping the jury's view of the victim's credibility. Further, by a definition of rape as nonconsensual sex,' 49 evidence intended to prove consent would also implicate credibility.' 5 147. Courts often justified the use of unchastity evidence in rape trials technically as a form of character or propensity evidence. This usage itself represented an exception to the general rule that character or propensity evidence is inadmissible as substantive evidence to prove that the person acted in conformity with the character trait. See Galvin, supra note 8, at 777-78. Professor Galvin provides a detailed and lucid explanation of this and other evidentiary biases that led to the rape shield laws and other rape law reforms in the early 197os. She explains that at common law, evidence of the victim's character was admissible in only two types of cases: homicide cases in which the defendant claimed self-defense and rape cases in which the defendant claimed consent. Id. at 78-83. In the prototypical self-defense case, the defendant claims that the victim was the aggressor and offers the character evidence to show that the victim was a violent person and that he acted violently again. In the prototypical rape case, the defendant says that the complainant agreed to sexual activity and offers the chastity evidence to show that she "had a propensity to engage in nonmarital sexual activity." Id. at 783. Not surprisingly, then, courts invariably touched upon credibility as they attempted to explain why unchastity evidence should be admissible in rape trials even though it could not be used to impeach credibility in other types of cases. For example, in an 189o Maryland case, Brown v. State, the court identified cases of rape as a "well-recognized exception" to the "general rule"
that "the character for veracity of a female witness cannot ... be impeached by evidence as to her character for chastity." ' 1 In rape cases, the court observed, the general character of the prosecutrix for chastity is always admissible "for obvious reasons."" 5 2 While acknowledging that a rape could conceivably be committed "even upon a lewd... woman," the court nevertheless felt that her lewdness "may have a material bearing upon the question whether the act was committed with or against her consent." ' Here the court seemed to understand chastity evidence as bearing both on consent and credibility. Although the court agreed that chastity is not ordinarily a predictor of credibility, in an echo of that disavowed logic, the court saw rape as a abuse of any woman above the age of ten years against her will." Id. at 3 n.8 (quoting EDWARD 
COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 60
(photo. reprint 1979) (1628)). In many jurisdictions, an additional emphasis on force or resistance later crept into this definition, although it was often understood as probative of consent. Id. (citing Moran v. People, 25 Mich. 356, 359 (1872) ("As a practical matter, the state will usually offer proof of force (or threats) as well as absence of consent since the former bears so directly on the latter.")). Although the force requirement imposed a "special burden of opposition" in some jurisdictions, Berger, supra note 2, at 8, "female nonconsent" generally remained the "rubric under which all of the issues in a close case [were] addressed and resolved." ESTRICH, supra note lo, at 29.
15o. Katherine Baker has framed this link between a woman's sexual history and her credibility in terms of "juror disregard" rather than "juror disbelief." Katharine K. In other words, "[i]f a woman breaches [very rigid norms of appropriate sexual conduct], her credibility becomes largely irrelevant because the jury will not bother to vindicate her violation." Id. This modern articulation of the problem with admitting sexual history evidence helps articulate the fallacy in trying to parse the question of consent from other issues influencing the jury. To try to separate jurors' disregard of a woman's plight from their disbelief, however, seems equally fallacious. If we understand a woman's honor and by extension her credibility and her very integrity as a person to be implicated by any breach of sexual norms, then juror disregard in the face of such information is the natural product of the disbelief that comes with a woman's sullied honor. Whether jury members think a woman is incapable of being raped or evince a pure skepticism about her lack of consent, at root they disbelieve her statement that she has, in fact, been violated based on the implications they derive from her sexual past.
151. 20 A. 186, 188 (Md. 189o).
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153. Id. circumstance where the connection between chastity and truth was "obvious."' ' 4 The statutory rape case from North Dakota, State v. Apley, suggests even more strongly that in rape cases unchastity evidence functioned primarily to interrogate the victim's credibility.' s Because it was a statutory rape case, credibility, not consent, was the issue, and the defendant offered sexual history evidence to impeach the victim's testimony. The majority, which ruled in favor of admitting the evidence, seemed unconcerned with the precise boundaries between consent and credibility. In contrast, the dissent argued that if unchastity evidence were admissible at all, it would be admissible only to prove consent, not to undermine credibility. To defend its position, the majority cited treatises by Wigmore and Greenleaf,' s6 two encyclopedias of evidence, 5 7 and a long list of cases purporting to hold that "want of chastity may be shown as affecting credibility of the prosecutrix as a witness.',, 8 The dissent painstakingly reviewed much of the same law to show that unchastity evidence, if admissible at all, could only be introduced to show consent or some material fact other than credibility.' s9 Although both sides marshaled an impressive array of sources, the sources themselves were replete with ambiguity. While in seeming agreement that chastity evidence was relevant in a rape trial, the treatises did not consistently identify consent as the rationale.
Professor Greenleafs treatise on evidence demonstrates just how little guidance courts received from such compilations. In the section titled "Facts not affecting credibility," the treatise states:
There is another class of questions ... the answers to which, though they may disgrace the witness in other respects, yet will not affect the credit due to his testimony. Ironically, Francis Wharton's treatise on criminal law, another treatise cited by the majority in Apley, ' 6 ' does identify the purpose of impeaching a rape victim with her sexual history as consent, not credibility:
At common law and under statute, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, the chastity or want of chastity on the part of the female is immaterial in the commission, or the charge of the commission, of the crime of rape; for carnal knowledge of a woman, without her consent and against her will, constitutes rape where she is lewd and immoral or unchaste, just the same as though she were of the most spotless purity and virtue; but on accusation of the commission of the offense against a woman of unchaste or immoral character, her want of chastity may be shown as bearing on the question of consent to the act. 164 It seems counterintuitive that the majority in Apley, as it defended the admission of sexual history evidence in a statutory rape case, would cite to language from Wharton that explicitly excludes evidence of sexual history unless consent is at issue. Yet the majority seems indifferent to the point.
People v. Abbot, an early New York case relied upon by the Apley majority, shows that, even in a nonstautory rape case, unchastity evidence functioned to undermine the victim's credibility.1 6 s Abbot involved a rape prosecution on behalf of a woman who had been a servant in the house of the married defendant, a clergyman. The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that he should have been permitted to ask the victim "whether she had not had Rose, 6 7 that prostitution evidence was inadmissible to impeach general credibility, the Abbot court articulated a seemingly contradictory position: "Without expressing an opinion whether it may commonly be used even as an item in the estimate of general credibility, I do not feel clear that it should be repudiated in respect to the prosecutrix, where the trial is for rape.",1 6 8
The majority in Apley cited Abbot for the proposition that a female rape victim's credibility could be impeached by showing her to be a prostitute., 6 , And, indeed, this is one way of interpreting the above language. The Abbot opinion proceeds, however, to try to distinguish evidence bearing on consent from that bearing on credibility. In concluding that this instance of specific act impeachment was proper, the court argued for its relevance to consent:
In such a case the material issue is on the willingness or reluctance of the prosecutrix-an act of mind. These offences ... are in their very nature committed under circumstances of the utmost privacy. The prosecutrix is usually, as here, the sole witness to the principal facts, and the accused is put to rely for his defence on circumstantial evidence. Any fact tending to the inference that there was not the utmost reluctance and the utmost resistance, is always received ....
[A] re we to be told that previous prostitution shall not make one among those circumstances which raise a doubt of assent? ... And how is the latter case to be made out? How more directly ... than by an examination of the prosecutrix herself? 170 The court went on to claim that precedents such as Bakeman mistakenly supposed that unchastity testimony was designed to "shake the general credibility of the witness, as if it went to truth and veracity." 17 ' To the contrary, the court insisted that "it goes to her credibility in the particular matter, to a circumstance relevant to the case in hand, from which the jury are asked to say she did consent."' 72 We need look no further than Apley for confirmation that, despite these efforts, the Abbot majority did not succeed in convincingly refraining credibility as consent.
If the idea that a rape victim's credibility was bound up in her sexual history is a direct descendant (if not a sibling) of the equation between female honor and chastity, why were courts able to understand the irrelevance of chastity evidence except in the case of rape? In addition to the answers already developed in scholarship discussing rape's distinctive treatment among crimes, ' 7 another lies in the courts' own explanation: in the rape trial, such evidence could be admitted on another ground, namely consent. 174 Consent, a question that, as we have seen, necessarily encompasses the issue of credibility in a rape trial, became the way station of women's honor, the place where a woman's credibility would continue to be judged by her 1995) provides a brief, but useful overview of the scholarship on genesis of the various rape biases in the law. Those explanations include: that "rape law regulated women's sexuality and protected male rights to possess women as sexual objects," "sociolegal conceptions of women as the property of males," "concern that women would deliberately lie about rape in order 'to explain premarital intercourse, infidelity, pregnancy, or disease, or to retaliate against an ex-lover or some other man,"' id. at 224 (quoting C. SPOHN From the nature of the offense charged, the testimony of the female who claims to have been assaulted is generally the principal, and may be the only, evidence that the crime has been committed. In a case of this character a broad latitude of cross-examination should be allowed the accused in order to test the veracity of such a witness. State v. Rivers, 74 A. 757, 759 (Conn. 19o9). These concerns are weighty, but, as rape law reformers pointed out in their bid to have such evidence excluded, they are not met by the use of sexual history evidence to impeach victim credibility or to prove conduct in conformity with a character for promiscuity on the part of the victim. chastity and her reputation. 1 7s As time went on, courts increasingly accepted the relevance of unchastity as a given that required no reasoned rationale. Judge Riley's opinion for the West Virginia Supreme Court in a 1953 case is illustrative. 176 After finding that the victim's sexual history was "admissible to show that she probably gave her consent to the alleged intercourse," the judge goes on to recommend readers to Wigmore "[f]or a detailed and scholarly discussion of the question" of the admissibility of such evidence in a prosecution for rape. 177 In fact, many courts seem to have relied on Wigmore or penal codes based on his teachings as a substitute for reasoned explanation of the rule.' This rule is based on the theory that a person of bad moral character is less likely to speak the truth as a witness than one of good moral 175. Rape law continues to be plagued by double standards. Federal Rule of Evidence 413, which became effective in 1995, "singles out sexual assault as the only crime to which the general prior act rule [excluding evidence of prior bad acts to prove a propensity of the defendant to act in conformity therewith] does not apply," Baker, supra note 15o, at 569. Ironically, "enhancing victim credibility" was a major rationale given by proponents of the additional evidentiary rule. Id. at 583. character, and that a woman who is chaste will be less likely to consent to an illicit connection, than one who is unchaste.
179
The court, perhaps sensing that a rule that unchastity is relevant to consent cannot be defended on the mere assertion that chaste women consent less, unwittingly grounded its rationale on our old friend credibility. Although courts and treatise writers had banished the trappings of gender-specific honor from ordinary impeachment,"' in rape trials, unchastity and reputation were still closely allied as substantive markers of female truth.
B. Moral Turpitude, Honor, and the Prostitute
Rape shield laws substantially limited the types of sexual history evidence that could be introduced, 8 ' usually by excluding evidence of the complainant's sexual history unless with the defendant. Nonetheless, certain perceived offenses against sexual morality still recall the link between female honor and sexual purity. One of those offenses is prostitution. It stands as a remnant of a seemingly antiquated moral code, particularly to the extent that it is still a crime and one that most often targets female offenders. 8 2 Prostitution is also still overtly linked to untruthfulness in many states through the idea that a prior prostitution conviction can be used to impeach the credibility of a witness.' Although most states have adopted language from the Uniform without a conviction, evidence the victim participated in prostitution is admissible for impeachment purposes. 19 Nowhere is the modern attitude toward prostitution evidence more striking than in Massachusetts, a state that first rejected impeachment of a witness's credibility with evidence of prostitution in 1846.96 In 2005, the Massachusetts Supreme Court heard Richard Harris's appeal of his rape conviction. 1 97 The original crime had many elements of the stranger rapes that studies have shown are least likely to breed skepticism in judges and juries'98: the victim had never met the alleged rapist, she was dragged into a stairway where she was allegedly raped, witnesses saw her run screaming back to the bar as soon as she could break free, and she immediately told the bartender she had been raped. 9 9 The victim, however, had previously been convicted of "Nightwalking." 2° Mr. Harris's defense was that the sex was a consensual transaction."' Accordingly, one of the issues on appeal was his contention that the trial judge had "discretion to admit evidence of a complaining witness's conviction of a prior sexual offense for purposes of impeaching that witness." ' Although the Massachusetts rape shield statute prohibited evidence of a sexual assault victim's "sexual conduct," ' 3 the Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trialY. 2 4 The majority found that despite the common law rule on the issue of consent and despite the rape shield statute's addition of a "prohibition of evidence of the complainant's 'reputation' in such matters," an older statute allowing a witness's prior criminal conviction to "affect [the witness's] credibility" should be allowed to "carv[e] out an extremely narrow exception" to the rape shield law. 0 5 Thus, it found that the trial judge should have considered the possibility of admitting the evidence of prostitution.
In her dissent, Chief Justice Marshall identifies prostitution evidence as a new frontier for gendered notions of honor. After underscoring the difficulty in persuading juries that prostitutes are victims of rape, she cites the 1846 case overruling Murphy as evidence that courts "have long sought means to minimize jury bias against prostitutes.,,,,6 Contrary to the case's holding, she argues, the Harris majority essentially invites juries to "infer that an alleged rape victim is more likely to be fabricating an accusation of rape because she has been convicted of a crime involving sexual conduct, such as being a 'common nightwalker."' 2 7 Even though the prostitution conviction must, by statute, be brought in "solely 'to affect [the witness's] credibility,"' she notes that in a case "where the witness is a rape complainant who claims lack of consent, the issue of her credibility mirrors precisely the issue of her consent. ,2o8
With its decision in Harris, the Massachusetts Supreme Court returned to the interconnected paths of sexual purity, credibility, and the new signpost, consent, suggesting that chastity or the lack thereof, continues to function as the marker of a woman's credibility. Where that marker applies has merely shifted from all women, to any rape victim, to prostitutes. Thus, although courts have made progress in crafting gender-neutral impeachment rules, they are still open to the suggestion that a woman who offends sexual norms cannot be believed. Only time will tell whether Massachusetts, which took almost thirty years to overrule its decision in Murphy, will act more quickly this time to re-sever the probative link between a woman's chastity and her credibility.
CONCLUSION
This Note has demonstrated that "honor," "reputation," and "truthfulness" are gendered concepts with a powerful cultural history that continues to reverberate in legal rules that strive for neutrality. These reverberations are not simple oddities that may bemuse the scholar who delves into old case law and superseded precedent. They have consequences in the courtroom and in the imagination. The problematic of gender and honor, nonetheless, cannot be readily extinguished through model legislation or rule changes. Its cultural 206. Id. at 75 (Marshall, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). roots are too deep. At best, we can hope to explore those roots and recognize their latest offshoots in our courts.
